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ǯǫ 
Dr Fay Farstad1, Prof Neil Carter2, Prof Charlotte Burns3 
 
Abstract ǯ
exit from the European Union (so- ǮǯȌ   success and 
survival of the ǯcy, the Climate Change Act 
2008. The impact of Ǯǯa Ǯǯ
the Climate Change Act are assessed, building on documentary evidence 
and elite interviews with key policy-makers and policy-shapers. The 
article argues that the long-term viability of the Climate Change Act was 
being threatened even before the EU referendum, and that Brexit will do 
little to improve this situation. Even though the existence of the Climate 
Change Act is not under immediate threat, a range of issues presented by 
Brexit risk undermining its successful implementation.   
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Introduction 
With the imminent departure of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European 
Union (EU)ǡǮǯto 
investigate future policy and governance opǤǯ 
energy and climate change relationships with the EU have received some 
attention, there has been no detailed analysis of the potential implications of    ǯ    2008 (CCA)ǡ  ǯ 
climate policy. This oversight is surprising, especially as the long-term 
viability of the CCA was questioned even before the EU referendum.i The lack 
of attention might stem from the assumption that the CCA will be unaffected 
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by Brexit as it is a domestic piece of legislation. This is specious reasoning, 
however, as even the softest of Brexit scenarios will have significant 
ramifications for ǯ survival and success.  
The CCA was groundbreaking in two respects: it constituted the ǯfirst 
attempt to make climate change targets legally binding for a government and 
it was passed with overwhelming cross-party support (only three MPs voted 
against it). The CCA sets an ambitious target of 80% greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions reduction below 1990-levels by 2050, to be achieved through five-
yearly carbon budgets. Each carbon budget is set twelve years in advance, 
both to give sufficient long-term incentives for investors and to bind future 
governments to meeting emissions targets. An independent expert 
Committee on Climate Change (CCC) was established to provide 
recommendations on the amount of GHG emissions that should be permitted 
under each carbon budget and to monitor progress. The Government has to 
set out policies and proposals sufficient to meet the carbon budgets and 
report regularly to Parliament on progress implementing them.  
In this article, ǮǯǮǯCCA 
are assessed. 	 ǡ  Ǯǯ      
Market and European Economic Area membership and remaining in the  Ǥ  Ǯǯ       
Organisation (WTO) rules or negotiating a bilateral agreement with the EU. 
The analysis draws on documentary evidence and eleven elite interviews 
with key policy-makers and policy-shapers. The interviewees consisted of six 
politicians from across the political spectrum (Green, Labour, Liberal 
Democrat, Conservative and Scottish National Party), two members of the 
CCC and three representatives from influential environmental non-
governmental organisations (ENGOs). The first section of the article outlines 
the domestic challenges faced by the CCA pre-referendum. The subsequent 
sections then outline the potential implications of the two Brexit scenarios for 
the main features of the CCA. The article argues that, although it is unlikely 
that the CCA would be repealed, a range of issues presented by Brexit risk 
undermining its success.  
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Ǯǯ 
Created in 2008, the CCA was passed at the height of public concern for 
climate change and amid intense party competition and cross-party 
consensus on the issue. Since then the global financial crisis followed by the 
austerity policies of the Coalition and Conservative Governments from 2010 
have seen climate change slip back down the political agenda. Climate change 
has also become an increasingly partisan issue, manifested in widespread 
opposition on the Conservative backbenches to onshore wind farms and 
green levies Ȃ a level of discontent that famously prompted the despairing cry 
from David Cameron to Ǯ      ǯ    
energy bills.ii The Conservatives have evinced waning climate ambitions in 
recent years, weakening some of the key policies underpinning the CCA Ȃ 
from stopping subsidies for onshore wind and scrapping the zero carbon 
homes scheme, to selling off the Green Investment Bank and dismantling the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change. The party also strongly supported 
fracking in its 2017 manifesto, which critics argue would prevent the UK from 
shifting away from fossil fuels to renewable energy.  
Importantly, the Government is unlikely to meet one of the key requirements 
of the CCA, because existing policies and proposals will not achieve the 
emission reductions required by the fourth and fifth carbon budgets (the 
periods of 2023-2027 and 2028-2032 respectively). The urgent need to Ǯǯy the CCC on several occasions. 
In its progress report to Parliament in 2016, the CCC pointed out that current 
policies are likely to deliver at best only half of the required emissions 
reductions from 2015 to 2030.iii Similarly, environmental law organisation 
ClientEarth warned ǯe policy 
gap were not addressed ǮǡǡǯǤiv  
Even the long overdue Clean Growth Strategyv Ȃ which was published in 
October 2017 and lays out the 
ǯo meet the fourth and fifth 
carbon budgets as required under the CCA Ȃ failed fully to close the policy gap, 
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prompting ClientEarth to announce that it was considering legal action. The 
publication of the plan was severely delayed by the EU referendum and the 
2017 general election. Yet despite having had over a year to develop the plan 
since the fifth carbon budget was approved in June 2016 Ȃ and despite the 
Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) identifying      Ǯ ǯ  progress in the plan Ȃ the 
document includes surprisingly little detail about how Brexit might affect UK 
climate policies. This lack of analysis on the impact of Brexit suggests a failure 
to plan sufficiently for the future and provide investors and green groups with ǯ-term strategy.  
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the majority of the actors interviewed criticised the 
Government for not making climate change a priority and for shying away 
from incurring the short-term costs (and potential unpopularity) of 
implementing new climate policies. Three interviewees argued that climate 
change was indeed a priority for the Government, although they admitted that Ǥ	ǣǮverything they have said so 
far suggests that it is still important to them. Where on their list of priorities 
it comesǡǥǯȋCCC ȌǮȋǥȌ there is no    ǯ ȋ
 ȌǤ Nonetheless most of our 
interviewees believed that the cross-party consensus underpinning the 
creation of the CCA in 2008 had weakened. The disappointing role of the 
media was commented on in this respect, with several interviewees arguing 
that the media were failing to maintain the saliency of the issue and, according 
to a Liberal Democrat politician, providing a    Ǯstrongly ǯ. One ENGO representative 
observed thatǣ ǮThe whole thing [the CCA] is designed to work on the 
assumption that people will be listening to the Climate Change Committee, 
and that if the ǲovernment has said X but it is obviously 
not doing anything in order to achieve itǳ that would cause political problems. 
The Climate Change Committee has been saying so this year in bold italic 
capital letters and it got almost no coverageǤǯ Similarly, another ENGO 
representative commented thatǣ Ǯ   
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the level ȏ Ȑǯ Ȃ high saliency of the issue and public pressure to 
maintain cross-party consensus are also required. As such, the success of the 
CCA was already under threat before the EU referendum, as the low saliency 
and priority given to the issue and the growing partisan divide endangered 
its sustainability.  
 
Achieving the emissions target  
One of the key features of the CCA is its overall and ambitious target of 80% 
GHG emissions reductions by 2050. Both Brexit scenarios pose challenges to 
the achievement of this goal. At the most general level, negotiating and 
implementing any Brexit scenario could provide a substantial distraction 
from the urgent task of reaching the emissions target for the Government and 
civil service. Inaction by the government will also lead to business insecurity, 
and prevent the investments necessary to reach the target from taking place. 
The Ǯdistractionǯ of Brexit was frequently mentioned in the interviews as a key 
challenge, and most actors feared that climate change could become even less 
of a government priority as a consequence.  
The interviewees also voiced fears that this trend could be further aggravated 
if Brexit leads to a protracted economic downturn. Echoing the period 
following the global financial crisis, climate change is likely to become a lower 
priority if times are hard (though economic downturns are also associated 
with lower emissions). As one ENGO representative put it, climate change   Ǯ  ǯǤ One reason for this concern is that 
even under a soft Brexit, the UK stands to lose significant amounts of funding 
from a range of EU sources, which could undermine efforts to reach the CCAǯs 
emissions target. Most significantly, under the current EU budget (covering 
2014-2020), the UK receives approximately  ? ?Ǥ ?nd projects that 
support the environment and tackle climate change.vi Moreover, non-EU 
countries do not receive preferential treatment from the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), which indicates a further potential funding reduction ǯtransition, as nearly 30% of EIB loans to the UK have 
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supported energy infrastructure (amounting to over £8 billion in the past five 
years Ȃ double that of the Green Investment Bank).vii The UK is also likely to 
lose out on EU funding for Research and Development, from which it has been 
a net beneficiary. Under a harder version of Brexit, foreign investment and 
access to skilled workers may well diminish, potentially delaying and 
increasing the cost of developing infrastructure and low carbon technology.  
Likewise, under a hard Brexit the UK will no longer have to follow the 
environmental and energy aquis (the body of common rights and obligations 
that is binding on all the EU member states), and a key external incentive for 
action will thus no longer apply. The CCC estimates that EU policies have 
contributed to around 40% of UK emissions reductions since 1990, and cover 
about ǯ ? ? ? ?ǤAccording to a 
CCC member, the loss of such legislation would be particularly serious for 
climate adaptation policies, as these are more dependent on EU law than 
mitigation policies, which should be largely protected through international 
agreements. The absence of EU Directives in these areas also means that UK 
businesses lose an important source of investment stability, as climate 
policies become vulnerable to the domestic electoral 
cycle instead. Furthermore, there is a concern that extant EU law will start to 
be dismantled or weakened post-Brexit, both through the EU Withdrawal Bill 
process and in the future.viii Several interviewees were worried that the Ǯǯȋ
to edit large amounts of transferred EU legislation via secondary legislation) 
would prevent proper parliamentary scrutiny of legislative changes that 
might affect climate policies as the UK leaves the EU. For example:  
µ7KHPDLQ WKLQJ LV WKHKXJHDPRXQWRISRZHU WKDW LW >(8:LWKGUDZDO
Bill] gives to the Government to fiddle with EU regulations, and that 
however good intentions might be, that gives them an awful lot of scope 
to get rid of awkward things that might not be noticed. If the Bill is 
passed through as it is, civil servants and ministers will see an 
opportunity to get a whole load of stuff through, most of which will not 
be noticed, and get rid of what are seen as inconvenient environmental 
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UXOHV«7KHUHLVDhuge danger then, even if there is not an overt will 
to do that. There is just so much temptation because there is that window 
to junk a load of stuff that you do not really like, even though it might be 
JRRG¶/LEHUDO'HPRFUDWSROLWLFLDQ 
An associated concern is that under a hard Brexit the UK will lose an 
important mechanism for holding the government to account and settling 
disputes via the Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). EU reporting and monitoring requirements have been an important ǯs, and the threat of being fined 
by the Commission for persistent underperformance (infraction) is an 
important incentive for governments to stay on track with environmental 
obligations. However, a CCC member argued that the reporting requirements 
to Parliament under the CCA were critical in preventing progress from 
slipping and for holding the government to account, and would hopefully 
alleviate some of the above concerns. Yet Defra Minister Michael Gove, in his 
address to the Environmental Audit Committee on the 2nd November 2017, 
admitted that new institutions would have to be designed to replicate these 
EU functions and to Ǯǯ. This adds to the already heavy 
workload of the UK civil service, however, and there is no guarantee that any 
putative new UK institutions will be as effective. The risks created by the 
governance gap were identified by several actors as the most significant 
challenge presented by Brexit.  
 
Carbon budgets, the ETS and energy 
Brexit also raises the question as to whether the UK will withdraw from the ǯ    ȋȌǤ Under a soft Brexit the UK would 
continue to be a member. However, ETS membership requires accepting the 
jurisdiction of the CJEU, something that Theresa May has rejected, calling it a ǮǯǤThus as the softer Brexit scenario seems improbable, it is likely that 
the UK will withdraw from the ETS, which poses several challenges.  
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For example, leaving the ETS could make it harder to reach ǯemissions 
targets. Even though the UK has a domestic floor price for carbon credits 
(starting at around £16 per tonne of CO2 and aiming to reach £30 per tonne 
by 2020) UK companies benefit from being members of the ETS as they have 
access to a larger potential market within which they can sell and purchase 
allowances, thereby reducing costs. Furthermore, exiting the ETS would 
entail an adjustment to the carbon budgets and a change in the way they are 
accounted, taking up valuable civil service time. Similarly, any UK 
replacement Ȃ for example a domestic emissions trading scheme or a carbon 
tax Ȃ would be complicated and time-consuming to establish and would raise 
problems of stability, scale and longevity outside a European framework. The 
interviewees were unanimous in lamenting the likely loss of access to the ETS. 
As one exclaimed: ǮǯȏȐǨǯ 
A UK departure from the ETS would also have negative consequences for the Ǥ	ǡǯ
credits. As the environmental think tank E3G point out,ix UK-originated 
allowances cannot simply be expropriated or cancelled as they were bought 
and traded in good faith and may no longer be held by UK companies. On the 
other hand, if no adjustments are made,  ǯs legacy carbon credits 
increase the amount o Ǯǯ Ǥ
Compensation is also costly and contentious. Leaving the ETS could therefore 
seriously undermine the integrity of the scheme. In addition, under both 
Brexit scenarios the UK will lose its political representation in EU bodies 
(such as the Commission, Council and European Parliament), thus reducing 
the pressure to reform the inefficiencies of the schemex Ȃ as well as EU climate 
and energy policies in general. All interviewees highlighted that under either 
Brexit scenario this loss of representation would entail less influence for the 
UK not just on EU climate policy, but over international climate policy as well 
because the UK would no longer be a member of the EU negotiating block. 
This lack of influence       ǯ  
slipping in the future, as the UK has traditionally been an important driver in 
this area, and a countervailing voice to less ambitious states such as Poland 
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and Hungary. As one CCC member observedǣ Ǯe have removed from 
ourselves the ability to influence other countries about this business of 
battling with climate change with us. We will be still doing that in the 
international agreements, but our particular direct and effective role with our 
nearest neighbours will have been removed. Therefore that is a disadvantage, 
furious disadvantage, in the battle against climate changeǤǯ 
A related issue ǯ (IEM) post-
Brexit. The IEM harmonises and liberalises energy markets across Europe, 
with the aim of spurring greater competition between providers and 
delivering cheaper and more reliable energy to countries and consumers. 
Remaining within the IEM keeps electricity prices down in the UK and helps 
meet demand, particularly for gas. However, as with ETS membership, access 
requires accepting the jurisdiction of the CJEU    ǯ
environmental and energy aquis. Brexit therefore implies the need to create 
a new agreement with the EU for access to the IEM. A Chatham House report 
in 2016 outlines the possible options for a post-Brexit energy relationship, 
reviewing the risks and trade-offs involved.xi It points out that a soft Brexit, 
although less disruptive as it retains access to the IEM, nonetheless comes at 
the cost of reduced influence and sovereignty, with the UK having to accept 
vast amounts of EU legislation over which it would have no say. A harder 
version of Brexit offers more sovereignty over energy policy, buildings, 
infrastructure and state aid Ȃ but at the expense of uncertainty over market 
access, investment and electricity prices. Either Brexit scenario thus poses 
challenges for the UK in gaining access to cheap, reliable, and Ȃ importantly Ȃ 
low carbon energy in the future, which would help it to meet the targets of the 
fourth and fifth carbon budgets.   
 
The Committee on Climate Change  
The final feature of the CCA is the Committee on Climate Change, which also 
has an Adaptation Sub-Committee that advises the Government on how to 
prepare for the impacts of climate change. At present the CCC is generally 
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respected by politicians, green groups and the media, having published a 
range of recommendations on how the Government can meet the carbon 
budgets as well as reports on Government performance in implementing the 
CCA. It has a watchdog function and an important role in holding the 
Government to account on climate change. Given its popularity and the 
standing of its members, it is unlikely that Brexit will have a significant effect 
on the existence or functioning of the CCC Ȃ at least in the short to medium-
term Ȃ as any Government seen to be undermining this institution would face 
quite serious criticism. Moreover, as a statutory committee set up through 
parliamentary legislation, disbanding the CCC would not be straightforward.  
However, it should be remembered that despite the respect and authority the 
CCC commands, the existence of the policy gap demonstrates that the 
Government has nonetheless failed to adhere fully to its recommendations. 
The policy gap persists, with emissions projected to be 6% and 9.7% above 
the requirements of the fourth and fifth carbon budgets respectively, despite 
the introduction of new measures. Furthermore, the chairman of the CCC, 
Lord Deben, recently 
ǯ Clean Growth Strategy for 
planning to use Ǯǯinternational carbon credits to meet the 
carbon budgets, instead of domestic action as the CCA intends. Similarly, the 
lack of media coverage of this policy gap raises the question of how influential 
the CCC really is. Thus the strength of the CCC is already being tested, and 
Brexit can only augment the challenges it faces over the longer term.  
Another reason for concern is the example of the Australian Climate Change 
Authority, created in the image of the British CCC. Australian climate change 
politics has been more contentious than in Britain, and Australian climate 
policies remain at the lower end of ambition amongst developed countries. 
The Australian Climate Change Authority has struggled to influence the 
Government, and has had internal debates as to whether it should base its 
recommendations on what scientific evidence warrants or what is politically 
feasible Ȃ with three members resigning in protest over what they perceive 
to be the latter approach.xii If a hard version of Brexit leads to an economic 
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downturn and climate change slips down the political agenda as a result, it is 
not inconceivable that the CCC will face similar debates in the future.  
As such, it might be the case that the CCC is safe simply because it is not worth 
the trouble of abolishing. For now, however, its continued existence remains 
secure, provided reputable researchers continue to participate in it and well-
respected and prominent figures chair and promote it. However, even such 
characteristics should not be taken for granted Ȃ as evinced by the Australian 
case. Closer to home, the mass walk out of members of the Social Mobility 
Commission over the Goveǯ      
due to Brexit dominating the political agenda, also highlights the potential 
risks Brexit poses to independent bodies seeking to shape government policy. 
 
Is it all bad news? 
It is important to note that Brexit might also provide some positive 
opportunities for UK climate change efforts. First, being outside the EU might 
allow the UK to play a more innovative role in international climate change 
negotiations, as Norway has occasionally managed to do. Second, several   ǯ
post-Brexit provides a golden opportunity to reform UK agricultural policy in 
a more climate-friendly direction, helping to meet both climate mitigation and 
adaptation goals. Third, some interviewees hypothesised that if Brexit leads 
to the transfer of further powers to the devolved nations, this might lead to a ǯǮǯ, as 
Scotland and Wales have generally been more ambitious on climate change 
than the UK Government. Finally, and perhaps less seriously, one interviewee 
noted that the distraction of Brexit may prevent the Government from 
dismantling climate policies further.  
Significantly, all the actors interviewed maintained that it was highly unlikely 
that any Government would overtly try to scrap the CCA, and that the main 
risk from Brexit related to keeping it alive and successful. The vast network 
of ENGOs in the UK and general acceptance amongst the majority of 
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politicians and parties about the science of climate change meant that there     Ǯ ǯ   CCA from being overturned. 
Moreover, the global momentum behind action on climate change and rapid 
technological developments in renewable energy and road transport may 
mean the targets will be met regardless of the poor efforts of the Government. 
Importantly, having the CCA is regarded as being (considerably) better than 
nothing, as it ensures that climate change remains on the political agenda in 
some shape or form. Indeed, a CCC member maintained that the CCA was in 
fact doing its job, as it had forced the Government to respond to the issue by, 
for example, publishing the Clean Growth Strategy, despite the distraction of 
Brexit.  
 
Conclusions 
Even the softest of Brexit scenarios poses significant challenges for the CCA. 
Although repeal of the CCA seems unlikely in the foreseeable future, a range 
of issues presented by Brexit risk undermining its success.  
The loss of EU legislation, recourse to EU institutions and various sources of 
funding Ȃ as well as the general distraction of negotiating and implementing 
Brexit Ȃ means that reaching  ǯ   could be harder to 
achieve. Leaving the ETS will entail an adjustment of the carbon budget and 
the way it is accounted, and losing access to this scheme and the internal 
energy market weakens the prospects of staying within the carbon budgets 
(as well as the integrity of these schemes themselves). Brexit might also lead 
to a significant loss of influence for the UK over international and EU climate 
policy. Due to its popularity, the CCC does not face significant risk in the short 
to medium-termǡ   
ǯ -Brexit failures and the 
example of the Australian Climate Change Authority should not encourage 
complacency about its long-term future.  
There were signs that the Government was already wavering in its 
commitment to achieving the ambitious medium-term emissions reductions 
targets set out in the carbon budgets even before the EU referendum, and 
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Brexit will do little to increase the salience of climate change or improve the 
cross-party consensus on it. Thus, even if the existence of the CCA is not under 
immediate threat, Brexit is almost certain to exert a negative impact on its 
effective implementation.  
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